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THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE POST-
CONTRACTUAL CORPORATION 
William W. Bratton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The political economics of corporate law changed abruptly during 
the 1980s. At the decade's start, the prevailing economics counseled that 
excess management power needed to be curbed for productivity's sake. 
Law reform was assumed to be an appropriate means to this end. 1 But 
this antimanagerialist paradigm fell from favor, and by the time the take-
over market became white-hot in 1984 and 1985, a "contract paradigm" 
had taken its place. The large American corporation reemerged as a 
nexus for a set of contracts among individual factors of production. 2 
Corporate governance followed suit, and reappeared as a field well suited 
to microeconomic modeling. By the time the stock market crashed in 
1987, academic corporate law's determinant presumptions had been re-
versed. Credit for this change goes in the first instance to Professor (later 
Judge) Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, the leading ex-
ponents of the new "contractarian" view. 
Easterbrook and Fischel led corporate legal theory up the mountain 
of contract. They restated every topic of consequence in the terms of 
financial economics. In so doing, they captured the rhetoric of academic 
corporate law, rewriting the story of shareholder-management relations 
to accord with a theme of self-protection through contract. 3 Where once 
we had shareholder dependence, they substituted cheap opportunities to 
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law. My thanks to Pete Malloy, Denis Segota, and Rich 
Shorten for research assistance. 
1 The leading commentaries advocated federal controls. See JOEL SELIGMAN, RALPH NADER 
& MARK GREEN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). 
2 This standard formulation came from Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 310 
( 1976). 
The "contract paradigm" is the law and economics model of the corporation and corporate law. 
It depicts all corporate participations as contractual relationships and looks to microeconomic mod-
els of optimal contracts for normative guidance. It should be distinguished from an older legal model 
of the corporation and corporate law. The legal model subordinates contractual participation to 
government creation and control and places normative emphasis on the positive law containment of 
corporate power. 
3 Easterbrook and Fischel's contractual self-protection story is retold infra in text accompany-
ing notes 28-38 . 
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diversify firm-specific risk. Where once we had unfair wealth transfers, 
they substituted market pricing that accounted for the risks of misallo-
cated gains. Where we once had excess management power, they substi-
tuted market constraints. Where we once had "needs" that called for 
reform, they substituted "costs" that blocked reform. 
Now Easterbrook and Fischel summarize their enterprise with The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law.4 This long-awaited5 book collects, 
highlights, and integrates their foundational pieces6 so as to give us a 
touchstone volume. This book provides a corporate law counterpart to 
Judge Posner's Economic Analysis of Law,? and a counter to Professor 
Eisenberg's positivist account, The Structure of the Corporation. 8 No 
other contemporary book about corporate doctrine approaches its theo-
retical force. 9 It may be that no comparable integration of corporate law 
and economics has appeared since 1934, when Berle and Means pub-
lished The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 10 
Then again, perhaps Easterbrook and Fischel's book should not be 
compared directly with The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
The Berle and Means book set the paradigm for a half-century of corpo-
rate law discourse. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law cannot 
replicate this feat, even if the contract paradigm holds sway for its own 
half-century. This book, after all, appears ex post. The contract para-
digm is by now long established. Moreover, it seems unlikely to stay in 
ascendance for a half-century, as the political economics of corporate law 
have begun to shift again. 
Easterbrook and Fischel's book is not quite in step with the new 
politics. Their contractual construct's three foundations-investor self-
4 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW (1991). 
5 The book was promised in a number of the component articles. See, e.g., Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); 
Frank H . Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 1416 
(1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities 
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 611 (1985). 
6 The result is a book sufficiently accessible to provide instructors and students with a plausible 
theoretical companion to the casebook. Here they succeed where a preceding book of excerpts, 
RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION (1980), did not. 
7 RICHARD A. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). 
8 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). 
9 This does not go to say that important books bearing significantly on corporate law have not 
appeared. Consider, for instance, the entire field of organizational economics. See, e.g., OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING (1985). But we need not stop there. See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS 
AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); IAN R. MACNEIL, 
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980). 
10 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (reprint ed. 1982). 
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protection, market price, and market constraint--operate with less force 
today than they did ten years ago. Recent events have diminished mar-
ket constraints and make investor self-protection seem a less plausible 
governance tool. Takeovers have disappeared along with easy credit. As 
real life Gordon Gekkos 11 have gone to jail, 12 managers have climbed 
back into the saddle-as ineffective and self-serving as ever, according to 
their mainstream critics.13 Commentators today assume the inadequacy 
of market constraints as they encourage institutional investors actively 
and collectively to assert themselves in corporate governance. 14 In the 
new context, investor self-protection is not an accomplished fact, but an 
aspiration to be realized through exhortation, 15 novel economic analy-
sis, 16 or law reform. 17 Corporate law seems to have ended the 1980s at 
the same point where it began them-grappling with the problem of ex-
cess management power in the Berle and Means corporation. 18 
11 This character in the movie WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) embodied the capi-
tal market actors providing the motive power for the market constraint story. For a discussion of 
this, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931, 1975-76 
(1991). 
12 See JAMES B. STEWART, D EN OF THIEVES 446-49 (1991). 
13 This year's leading corporate problem is management pay; it has, apparently, gone out of 
control. Criticism of "excessive" compensation of America's top executives is widespread. It has 
gotten to the point where Congressmen implicate executive pay as a principal element in America's 
decline in productivity and world competitiveness. See Hearing on Corporate Pay Responsibility Act 
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of 
Senator Levin). 
Traditionally, executive compensation practice has been justified on the existence of a market 
for labor. See generally Symposium, Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market, 
7 J. AccT. & EcoN. I (1985). Today's critics charge that this market is intentionally designed to 
eliminate the possibility that a corporation ever pays below the market average. The system is an 
internal ratchet mechanism which causes pay to spiral upward. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH 
OF ExcESS 9-15, 42-50 (1991) (providing anecdotal evidence). Even strict supporters of the market 
view are beginning to concede that this market does not operate flawlessly. See Michael C. Jensen & 
Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-
June 1990, at 138 (asserting that salaries and bonuses are not too high, but conceding that pay and 
corporate performance are not properly correlated). 
14 See, e.g., John Pound, Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, 70 HARV. Bus. 
R Ev., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 83, 85-87. 
15 Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Insti-
tutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991) (urging voluntary monitoring organization). 
16 BernardS. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). 
17 John C. Coffee, Jr. , Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 
91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1355-57 (1991). 
18 This does not go to say that Easterbrook and Fischel's effort to put the legal corporation on a 
different theoretical footing has had no effect on this discourse. Although the old "separation of 
ownership and control" is back with a vengeance, it is back in a different form . Today we address it 
as a question of agency cost control. Present organizational patterns are suboptimal and require 
reconstruction . This is taken up in the first instance as a matter of rewriting the organizational 
contract-a deregulatory regulatory discussion . 
This discourse creates a roadblock in the way of continued use of the nexus-of-contracts concept 
only if exhaustive discussions lead to the creation of no effective contractual means to solve the 
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One picks up The Economic Structure of Corporate Law looking to 
see how these recent developments impact on Easterbrook and Fischel's 
amended presentation. On the surface, little seems to have changed. 19 
Easterbrook and Fischel still seem to consider the economic barriers to 
shareholder control through the vote to be insurmountable. In their 
view, no shareholder holding less than one hundred percent has the right 
incentives, and the shareholder collective action problem can best be sur-
mounted by aggregating shares through mergers and tender offers.20 Re-
cent developments respecting the market for corporate control are given 
extended treatment. But even here Easterbrook and Fischel are selective. 
They take up the state antitakeover statutes,2 1 but make no mention of 
the finance-driven reduction of merger and acquisition activity. They 
prominently display recent empirical work proving that tender offers re-
sult in positive returns to equity holders. 22 But they do not mention a 
pending empirical question about the trade-off between these gains and 
the bankruptcy costs incurred during the present recession. 
These are incidental shortcomings, however. The book may not ad-
dress itself to all issues of the day, but its model has ample capacity to 
provide for these issues when the occasion to address them arises. In 
fact, as restated in the book, the model is capacious enough to allow for 
virtually automatic accommodation of most changes in the mainstream 
politics of corporate law. 
The model's provision for moderate results comes as a surprise. 
Although Easterbrook and Fischel were the undisputed leaders of the 
1980s' contractarian movement, they were not known as the voices of the 
mainstream contractarian position. Easterbrook and Fischel like to in-
sist that contract succeeds. True to the Chicago tradition of law and 
neoclassical microeconomics, they tend to accord determinative force to 
the triumvirate of investor self-protection, market price, and market con-
straint. The corporate law mainstream, in contrast, holds open a door to 
problems of corporate governance. This is an active possibility. It is not unlikely that the current 
round of instruction will fail to prompt active participation by institutional equity investors--either 
because investment institutions operate subject to their own heavy agency costs, or because activism 
does not turn out to be cost effective for the vast majority of institutions. These points are put 
forcefully in Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991). 
19 No doubt we will hear from Easterbrook and Fischel on this subject in the future. 
20 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supr:p note 4, at 67. Thus, when Easterbrook and Fischel take up 
proxy regulation they assume the cost effectiveness of institutional investor passivity and go on to 
refight an old battle against the corporate governance movement of the 1970s. I d. at 88-89. Pointing 
this out does not imply criticism. This approach very well may be correct. See supra note 18. 
Concern about management salaries appears in the book only by implication. In the course of 
their discussion of insider trading, Easterbrook and Fischel note that if insider trading profits are 
exploitative of shareholders, we therefore have to worry about all salaries. EASTERBROOK & Fis-
CHEL, supra note 4, at 262. Today, salaries are a public policy worry. See supra note 13. 
21 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 212-27. 
22 Id. at 190-98. 
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the proposition that contract can fail. It follows an economic model of 
the contractual firm, drawn from the work of Oliver Williamson and 
built around a recognition of contract failure. In this model the failure 
sometimes occurs because the pursuit of rational self-interest goes over-
board, becoming suboptimal opportunism. At other times, the failure 
occurs because of intrinsic limits on the problem-solving abilities of con-
tracting parties. 23 Either way, contract failure causes economic actors to 
build compensating governance structures, and sometimes even justifies 
government regulation. 24 
Review of the works collected in The Economic Structure of Corpo-
rate Law prompts reappraisal of Easterbrook and Fischel's reputation as 
neoclassical critics of the rest of the legal academy. They prove quite 
sensitive to the flow of the corporate law mainstream. When the moment 
for concrete decision arrives, they tend to find a way to join it. Much of 
the talk to the effect that market and other contracting processes achieve 
pricing solutions to every problem in corporate governance turns out to 
be just talk. They often conclude that the market or other contract pro-
cess in question has failed or arguably failed, and that regulation by stat-
ute or judicial intervention may be justifiable. As applied, if not as 
stated, their model is thoroughly Williamsonian. 
Easterbrook and Fischel are so astute that they keep a safe distance 
from the assertion that the corporation is a nexus of contracts. The book 
delimits and subordinates this once foundational proposition. This is an 
appropriate step. The claim that everything in corporate life and law is 
contract at some deep structural level has outlived its usefulness. The 
idea never worked all that well as it was. Its shortcomings have been 
exhaustively discussed. 25 It had heuristic value26 ten years ago, when 
microeconomic models of corporate structure were new to law. At that 
time the nexus-of-contracts assertion taught the lesson that the models 
have a valid bearing on legal corporate governance. Now that the lesson 
has been learned and, indeed, now that the rhetoric and politics of the 
entire field have been captured and tamed, the nexus-of-contracts theory 
no longer needs emphasis. Its heuristic value has been spent. Economic 
analysis can proceed without it on the uncontroverted assumption that 
the corporation has significant contractual aspects. 
23 See Williamson, supra note 9, at 45-61, 294-97, 301-02; Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern 
Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EcoN. LIT. 1537, 1544-46 (1981). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 85-89. 
25 See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985); Paul N. Cox, R eflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversifica-
tion of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Direc-
tors and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1987); Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of 
Corporate Governance: Beyond Eerie and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19 (1988). 
26 That is, it taught us to see the contractual aspects of an area of law previously thought to be 
largely constituted of sovereign directive. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 670 (1989). 
184 
87:180 (1992) The Post-Contractual Corporation 
The Commentary that follows expands on these observations. Part 
I highlights the mainstream aspects of The Economic Strncture of Corpo-
rate Law. It also reports on the rapidly diminishing status of the theory 
of the nexus-of-contracts corporation. It offers a simple explanation for 
these themes. The assertion "it takes a theory to beat a theory" is not 
strictly correct. A theory indeed may beat a theory. Nothing, however, 
beats a theory like a practice, and reference to practice makes the pure 
contractual corporation untenable. 
Part II extends this critical reading of the book to two particular 
topics as to which Easterbrook and Fischel retain a distinct profile as the 
market current of the corporate law mainstream. The first is their strong 
position against judicial imposition of gain sharing in corporate control 
transactions, based on their assertion that the content of the legal norm 
of shareholder expectations should be drawn from first generation finan-
cial economic models. This Commentary's argument in response notes 
the persistent appearance of gain sharing rules in corporate law and high-
lights its economic rationality. The second topic is Easterbrook and Fis-
chel's strong, cost-based presumption against the creation of additional 
corporate law. The argument in response questions the materiality of the 
asserted costs and the effectiveness of market-based enforcement 
substitutes. 
Part III makes two affirmative assertions to counter and substitute 
for the economic theory of the firm as presented by Easterbrook and Fis-
chel. First, corporate entities persist in corporate law because "organiza-
tion" as well as "contract" remains central to our experience of 
corporations. An effective theory of the corporation therefore must ex-
plain the entity's persistence in economically and politically acceptable 
terms. Second, a new heuristic is proposed to fill the theoretical space 
opened by the disappearance of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm. 
It is suggested that the corporation is a complex of relationships-legal, 
political, and social, as well as economic-and that corporate law medi-
ates between actors and concepts in the complex. Seeing corporate law 
as a mediative device27 makes possible a more plausible synthesis of 
microeconomics and existing legal structure than does the model set out 
in The Economic Strncture of Corporate Law. 
27 This "mediative" approach to corporate law is a mode of describing and explaining the Jaw 
that draws on the common-law tradition of practical reason. Such descriptions admit theoretical 
instability and complexity where the economic paradigm demands theoretical consistency. Their 
function, therefore, is primarily critical. This "mediative" conception does not amount to a norma-
tive model that purports io offer correct solutions to legal problems. For an extended explanation, 
see infra Part III. 
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II. THE GOING CONCERN 
A. Components of the Economic Model 
1. Mythic Origins. -Easterbrook and Fischel bring a familiar bun-
dle of assumptions to bear in their model of corporate law. Here free 
choice, intense competition, rational self-interest, and contractual risk-
allocation determine the life of the large corporation. 
It all begins with a creation story28 in which corporate governance 
provisions originate at the transactional margin. In the beginning, 
owner-managers go public, selling equity securities to outsiders. 29 The 
selling managers make determinant choices30 of jurisdiction31 and gov-
erning terms. 32 But, because this generative public offering occurs in a 
competitive market, they have an incentive to choose terms that meet the 
expectations of the security-holding public. If they offer the wrong 
terms, they get paid less for their securities. 33 
The story denudes management of significant power to engage in 
suboptimal self-serving behavior. The purchasing shareholders, being ra-
tional economic actors, assume that the selling managers will engage in 
self-serving behavior at holders' expense. They accordingly bid down the 
stock. This gives the selling managers an incentive to build in govern-
ance devices that control their own misbehavior. 34 
After the moment of creation, market controls take over. Competi-
tion in markets for employment, products, and corporate control keeps 
managers in line. 35 At the same time, stock market prices, which take 
governance problematics into account, 36 effectively protect new investors 
by bringing them in at a risk-adjusted rate of return and providing them 
a low-cost means of evaluating management's performance. 37 Over time, 
competition in the marketplace favors the survival of maximizing gov-
ernance terms. 38 
2. The Presumption Against Regulation.-The creation story opens 
the door for one of Easterbrook and Fischel's main points about corpo-
rate law: that there should be a presumption against having any more of 
it than already exists. The actors create governance terms, and the mar-
28 This is drawn from the basic economic text, Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2. 
29 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 6. 
30 Id. at 4. 
3 1 Jd. at 5. 
32 Jd. at 6. 
33 Jd. 
34 !d. at 7. 
35 Jd. at 4, 91, 96-97. 
36 Jd. at 18. 
37 Id. at 19-21,93 (discussion of market price sensitivity to changes in governance; direct moni-
toring too costly). 
38 !d. at 6, 13. 
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ket prices them. Therefore, terms mandated by law are justifiable only if 
"the terms chosen by firms are both unpriced and systematically perverse 
from investors' standpoints."39 
Easterbrook and Fischel make their market governance case with 
care. Their system is substantially-not absolutely-effective. No strong 
form market efficiency assertion appears: they assume that real world 
market prices do not perfectly reflect all risks all the time. Even so, Eas-
terbrook and Fischel make a strong claim for institutional primacy for 
the market price. The market, they say, does the best available evalua-
tive job. The evaluation is thorough-going, even extending to governance 
tenns.40 
Easterbrook and Fischel also stop short of claiming that market 
forces build an absolute barrier to inefficient managerial self-service. 
Here the law assists the market, fleshing out voluntary governance terms 
with gap-filling fiduciary duties. 41 Easterbrook and Fischel's managers 
also make questionable allocative decisions. But, as to these, Easter-
brook and Fischel take a deregulatory position. They make a strong 
claim respecting investor expectations, asserting that investors do notre-
quire legal protection. Risk-averse equity investors protect themselves 
from this conduct through portfolio diversification. Those who do not 
diversify fully are not risk averse.42 
What investors expect, say Easterbrook and Fischel, is whatever 
maximizes finn value,43 and, as between longstanding voluntary relations 
and regulation, the former are entitled to the presumption of efficiency. 44 
A showing of wrongdoing does not, in and of itself, justify regulation. 45 
Those who argue to the contrary subscribe to the "Nirvana fallacy"-the 
incorrect assumption that everything can be made perfect.46 Easterbrook 
and Fischel counsel against regulation even where a plausible, but argua-
ble, case for a mandated governance improvement has been made. 
Under the creation story, corporations can always opt-in to the rule in 
their certificates of incorporation.47 And, on the rare occasion when the 
case for intervention is clear cut, deterrent liability rules fare better than 
regulatory supervision.48 
39 !d. at 21 (emphasis in original). 
40 !d. at 18-19. 
41 !d. at 92-93. 
4 2 /d. at 29-30. Presumably they require no legal assistance. It should be noted that Easter-
brook and Fischel extend this judgment only to stock-pickers. The other main class of undiversified 
investors-managers-are risk-averse, and their risk-aversion causes agency costs. !d. 
4 3 !d. at 23. 
44 !d. at 82. 
4 5 !d. at 7. 
4 6 !d. at 303. 
47 !d. at 204-05 (discussing auctions in control contests). Cf id. at 263 (possibility of contracting 
to bar insider trading). 
4 8 !d. at 7. 
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3. The Economic Rationality of the Law.-Easterbrook and Fis-
chel articulate a structural legal theory founded on a presumption 
against new positive law. Such theories have radical implications. If new 
law is inappropriate today, then existing law probably was inappropriate 
at the moment of its formulation. A prescription for mass deregulation 
appears to follow. Easterbrook and Fischel do not move in this direc-
tion, however. Their presumption against regulation does not invite gen-
eral deregulation, but instead operates as a corollary to their second main 
point: that economic rationality is implicit in corporate law.49 
The economic rationality proposition is the tie that binds together 
this collection of essays. The book, as it were, shows students how eco-
nomic rationality determines the content of every chapter in the Corpo-
rations casebook. The student learns that the doctrine of disregard of the 
corporate fiction is rational. 50 In addition, the rules on shareholder vot-
ing51 and close corporations52 are rational. Economic rationality also 
justifies the duties of loyalty 53 and care, 54 most appraisal rights 
schemes, 55 and the law of damages. 56 Even the rules on shareholder de-
rivative actions pass inspection, albeit barely. 57 
Easterbrook and Fischel treat the federal securities laws with con-
siderably more suspicion and, indeed, equivocation. They present spir-
ited arguments against and in favor of both the insider trading 
prohibition and the mandatory disclosure system. In the end, they allow 
that economic rationality may support regulation in certain circum-
stances. 58 Only federal regulation of proxy solicitation and recent an-
titakeover developments are subject to open condemnation. 59 
This cumulative showing of economic rationality across the outline 
of basic corporate law is the book's principal contribution. The eco-
49 Id. at 315. Their regulatory politics, accordingly, are more Tory than radical conservative. 
50 Id. at 55. 
51 Id. at 63-70. 
52 Jd. at 228-52. 
53 Even as applied to sales of controlling blocks of stock, corporate opportunities and cash-out 
mergers. I d. at 109-44. Here I would take the position that Easterbrook and Fischel have to mis-
characterize the doctrine in order to fit it into their particular economic rationality framework . See 
infra notes 115-125 and accompanying text. 
54 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 90-91. 
55 Jd. at 161. 
56 Jd. at 315-16. 
57 Easterbrook and Fischel are suspicious of the derivative action as a value-maximizing device, 
but do not condemn it out of hand. Jd. at 100-02, 105-06. 
58 Id. at 262-63, 302-03. In their mandatory disclosure discussion, Easterbrook and Fischel offer 
a surprisingly warm endorsement of the hard information disclosure system of two or three decades 
ago. I d . at 289-90. Every conventional justification of the federal securities laws is, of course, dis-
missed out of hand. See, e.g., id. at 296-300 (increasing investor confidence in the marketplace by 
protecting unsophisticated investors and increasing supply of truthful information). 
59 Id. at 84-85 (shareholder proposal Rule 14a-8 is not cost efficient or democratic), 196-97 (re-
duction in value of firms protected by antitakeover provisions). 
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nomic rationality of many corporate law topics is far from obvious ex 
ante. The model has to be expanded and manipulated to accommodate 
them. 60 It takes considerable analytical skill to build the case as persua-
sively as Easterbrook and Fischel do here. 
This is not the Easterbrook and Fischel one remembers from the law 
reviews of the 1980s. In their separate articles, the normative struggle 
against regulation seemed to take first place on the agenda. But memory 
does not serve correctly. 61 The ratification of existing law has shared first 
place on Easterbrook and Fischel's agenda with the presumption against 
regulation all along. The two always have been closely intertwined in 
their model. 62 In fact, a successful ratification exercise is mandated by 
the model's very terms. As tends to be the case in law and economics, 
Easterbrook and Fischel's theory asserts the evolutionary dominance of 
conduct motivated by economically rational choice. For the theory to be 
proved valid, these forces must have a determinant role in the explana-
tion of existing law. The ratification exercise also is central to the cam-
paign to contain law reform and undermine academic theories that 
encourage reform. Ratification, after all, implies normative approval of 
the status quo. Happily, it does not also imply stasis. Economic condi-
tions change, and as that happens, competitive forces change law 
(although no doubt Easterbrook and Fischel would find that the changes 
take a deregulatory turn). 
Memory serves incorrectly here due to changes of time and context. 
The articles appeared at a time of theoretical instability. They addressed 
the immediate objectives of introducing a new rhetoric for academic dis-
course and capturing the normative high ground with a welfare concept 
defined in neoclassical microeconomic terms. What lingers in the mem-
ory, then, is their destabilizing rhetoric and aggressive deployment of the 
presumption against new regulation. A new encounter with the articles, 
as presented in the book, shows that the ratification exercise also figured 
into Easterbrook and Fischel's rhetorical campaign. Easterbrook and 
60 As a result, the economic model's parameters expand. See infra text accompanying notes 85-
91. 
61 My initial response to the book's insider trading and mandatory disclosure discussions, see 
supra text accompanying note 58 , was to ask whether these amounted to substantial revisions of 
Easterbrook and Fischel's prior work on these topics. Surely the earlier articles took stronger posi-
tions on the sufficiency of market processes and recommended substantial law reform. A check 
showed that my memory disserved me. Tentative justifications of the status quo are set out in the 
precedent works. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Inves-
tors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (\984). But see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The R egulation of 
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (198 3) (suggesting that extensive regulation of insider trading 
is unwarranted) . 
62 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 109-17 (1985) (existing law of piercing the corporate veil efficient, alterna-
tives probably costly). 
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Fischel introduced a new paradigm with a new vocabulary and different 
norms. A new paradigm's case as a replacement for a prevailing para-
digm is strengthened by consonance with the inherited juridical con-
struct. Indeed, this consonance is necessary for plausibility in a 
conservative context. The new theory transforms not the law, but the 
language of discussion and the underlying normative presumptions. 
Then, as events unfold, the new discourse (and, in this case, the presump-
tion against new regulation) comes to bear on the treatment of new 
issues. 63 
Today, of course, the campaign has ended with victory achieved. 
Easterbrook and Fischel address the book to a discourse in which their 
rhetoric is familiar and their welfare concept prevalent. In this clearer 
atmosphere, the ratification story becomes ripe for evaluation. 
In theory, the radical deregulatory rhetoric of Easterbrook and Fis-
chel's creation story meshes perfectly with the ratification of what is, af-
ter all, a substantial body of regulation. But, in fact, a tension persists 
between the two. The ratification occurs ex post. The law thus ratified 
was not formulated by reference to the economic model. 64 It tends to be 
formulated in doctrinal systems that are self-referential, although highly 
sensitive to all currents of the outside political economy. The law also 
tends more often to result from judgments between competing principles 
than from deductions from first principles. The rationality that informs 
it is more practical than economic.65 Rational economic explanations 
must be devised after the fact to accord with a broader theoretical pro-
gram. Tailoring these explanations to fit awkward institutional realities 
takes skill and effort, 66 as Easterbrook and Fischel's book shows. The 
completed ratification gives rise to a question: Whether, if reference had 
been made to the economic model at the time of the law's formulation, 
the law in question ever would have gotten onto the books. As an exam-
ple, consider Easterbrook and Fischel's conclusion that the insider trad-
ing prohibition and the mandatory disclosure system may be 
economically beneficial. It is hard to imagine that, applied ex ante by 
Easterbrook and Fischel or anyone else, the model would lead to that 
conclusion. The blunt self-protection story and presumption against reg-
ulation would overwhelm the artfully constructed justifications that the 
book presents. 
63 If, in the future, a segment of the duly ratified body of existing law comes up for reconsidera-
tion, it might well prove to lack economic rationality. 
64 Of course this is changing. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (relying on 
the fraud-on-the-market theory); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 
(Del. 1989). 
65 See infra text accompanying notes 172-77. 
66 In addition, it gives the academic an excellent opportunity for demonstrating his or her skills. 
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B. The Disappearing Nexus of Contracts 
The foregoing describes Easterbrook and Fischel's going concern 
without mentioning the nexus-of-contracts corporation. In making this 
omission, the description follows the lead of the book. Though the book 
leads off with the topic of the contractual corporation, it does not present 
quite the same nexus-of-contracts corporation that Easterbrook and Fis-
chel formerly presented as their paradigm's foundational concept. 67 As 
the following discussion shows, the emphasis has changed. 
1. Containing the Nexus of Contracts.-Easterbrook and Fischel 
pause at the book's start to "step back and ask whether corporation-as-
contract is a satisfying way of looking at things even in theory."68 To all 
appearances the proposition survives inspection. But the process drains 
off much of the content. 
Easterbrook and Fischel make an uncharacteristically half-hearted 
case. 69 The corporation, they say, is contractual in nature because it is a 
"voluntary" and "adaptive" "complex [of] arrangements."70 This state-
ment is true, but it does not support the old paradigm. Today's United 
States Army is also a "voluntary" complex of arrangementsJI Yet the 
Army's norm of sacrifice and structure of command make a contractual 
description unhelpful. As to "adaptive" capacity, the Delaware courts 
and legislature perform better in a dynamic economic environment than 
do, for instance, the car companies. Yet few would find it useful to de-
scribe state government as a nexus of contracts. 
Easterbrook and Fischel do not bother to pursue the claim that cor-
porate law is contractual at a deep structural level even when 
mandatorily phrased. It is just, they say, that the voluntary is more im-
portant than the mandatory to everyday operation and ultimate wel-
fare.72 This is another true statement. But it is a statement no observer 
would have bothered to dispute back in 1968, when the Second Circuit 
decided Texas Gulf Sulphur. 73 Nor do Easterbrook and Fischel claim 
67 For an unqualified statement of the contractual theory of the firm, see Frank H. Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395,401 (1983). See also Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1261-62 (1982). For a more 
careful, but still unqualified statement see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Close Corpora-
tions and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 283 & n.36 (1986). 
68 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 7. 
69 The bald claim that corporate law is just contract law on a large scale with no other meaning-
ful content does not show up often in the book. Id. at 90, 166. 
70 I d. at 12, 15-22. This part of the book repeats observations from Easterbrook & Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, supra note 5, at 1426-47. 
71 Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel note that some corporations are hierarchies with command 
structures. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 12. 
72 Id. at 3. Furthermore, the theorist must account for both aspects. Id. 
73 Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
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that agency-cost analysis leads to some necessarily contractual bottom 
line. Instead, they look for the balance of advantages among the various 
devices that control agency costs, 74 and not all of these are contractual. 
Easterbrook and Fischel do continue to employ a "contractual" nor-
mative yardstick. The law, they say, should replicate the contract the 
parties would have reached if left to themselves in a low-cost world. 75 
But deciding to bring a hypothetical contract norm to bear on corporate 
law questions does not, as a positive proposition, make the corporation a 
nexus of contracts. Hypothetical contract is a welfare norm asserted by 
an academic. It is not a transactional artifact. In Easterbrook and Fis-
chel's construct, the "contractual" analytical product is imposed without 
regard to whether the real-world actors in a situation of higher cost and 
bounded rationality would have employed it themselves if offered the 
chance. Here, if the issue ever is joined, welfare trumps choice. 
When The Economic Structure of Corporate Law deals with internal 
corporate problems in contractual terms, it brings to bear the relational 
contract paradigm.76 This is a telling theoretical choice. Easterbrook 
and Fischel avoid modeling internal relationships in the discrete transac-
tional terms that prevail in neoclassical microeconomic analyses of cor-
porate arrangements. 77 They conceive of interactions inside the firm in 
terms of "team" or "cooperative" production,78 rather than in strict 
terms of exchange. The actors, they say, cannot cost effectively solve all 
problems ex ante with contracts. Accordingly, judicial intervention pro-
vides an effective backstop for answering such questions. 79 Their model 
restricts discrete exchange to the stock market, the venue where it occurs 
in practice. 80 If Easterbrook and Fischel were not the authors, this dis-
cussion would garner the appellation "Williamsonian"8 1 as a matter of 
course. 
74 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 14. 
75 !d. at 15. 
76 For example, they say corporate law interpolates fiduciary duties as gap-fillers, not merely to 
save the parties some small change at the drafting table but because the range of problems is too 
open-ended to be subject to effective drafting solutions. Id. at 90-91. 
The discussion of the judicial role in close corporation disputes also amounts to relational con-
tract treatment. Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge the ambiguities intrinsic to situations in 
which the parties omit to supply contract terms, and also make the sensible suggestion that judges 
intervening in close corporation disputes should look to the drafting pattern emerging in larger, 
more exhaustively drafted enterprises. Id. at 238, 245, 250-52. See also id. at 66 (voting as a means 
to make decisions not provided by contract). 
77 For examples of such an analysis, see Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the 
Firm , 88 J. PoL EcoN. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 312-19. 
78 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 9. Here they draw not on Jensen and Meckling, 
but on the precedential work of Alchian and Demsetz. See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972). 
79 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 35. 
80 See, e.g., id. at 17-22. 
81 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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Given all of this, what was that nexus-of-contracts corporation all 
about in its day? The book provides an accurate answer: 
The arrangements among [corporate actors] usually depend on contracts 
and on positive law, not on corporate law or the status of the corporation as 
an entity. More often than not a reference to the corporation as an entity 
will hide the essence of the transaction. So we often speak of the corpora-
tion as a "nexus of contracts" or a set of implicit and explicit contracts 
82 
The nexus-of-contracts assertion, then, deflects attention from the shop-
worn juridical corporation, with its shareholder "owners," and its long 
history of conceptual concern for the role and meaning of the "corporate 
entity." 83 Clearing out this juridical clutter frees us to concentrate on 
economic fundamentals. We demystify the shareholders, now seeing 
them as investors who happen to have agency cost problems in their rela-
tionship with another group of corporate participants, the managers. 84 
Thus described, the "nexus of contracts" is not a positive and normative 
foundation for corporate legal theory, nor even much of an heuristic. It 
is a point of critique. 
2. The Containment Explained.-Easterbrook and Fischel have 
stepped back from the nexus-of-contracts corporation because develop-
ments in both theory and practice made manifest its inadequacy as a 
foundation for any plausible legal theory. The theoretical development 
was the "mandatory/enabling" discussion of the late 1980s. This 
showed that shareholder-manager relationships did not, in the main, lie 
within the zone of free contract. The practical development was the fail-
ure of crucial subject matter-the law addressed to takeovers-to de-
velop in conformity to the model's predictions. This showed 
emphatically that corporate law does not always instantiate contractual 
norms. The fact that these two topics had been the principal focus of 
corporate legal scholarship for a number of years made these develop-
ments doubly debilitating for the proposition that corporations are com-
prised of a nexus of contracts. 
(a) Mandatory corporate law affirmed.-The mandatory/enabling 
discussion was an extended consideration of the implications of the 
nexus-of-contracts proposition. The proposition on the table was this: If 
the firm is contract, then the parties in interest should be able to "opt-
out" of the terms provided by state law and substitute their own terms. 
Discussion of this proposition iterated contract law's "overreaching" 
analysis. It turned out that process defects make the corporate charter 
82 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 12. 
83 Easterbrook and Fischel see the "corporate entity" as a convenient form for organizational 
action. Id. 
84 Id. at 10-11. Easterbrook and Fischel thus confront the separation of ownership and control 
without denominating it as such, and cast this dichotomy in terms of risk-bearing roles. 
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amendment an inappropriate context for complete freedom of contract, 
even when viewed through the lens of an economic model. Shareholders 
have a collective action problem when managers propose charter amend-
ments. Small stakes make it irrational for individual holders to invest in 
information acquisition. 85 Moreover, managers, by virtue of their con-
trol of the structure and timing of the amendment process, can easily 
tum the shareholders' disadvantaged negotiating position to their own 
advantage. 86 The upshot is a contract failure: the shareholders rationally 
vote to approve an amendment that decreases value to them. 
A consensus of sorts emerged from the discussion. The amendment 
process is deemed reliable as to amendments such as poison pills or stock 
option plans that are company-specific and transaction-specific. But, as 
to general, open-ended proposals such as a broad-brush abolition of di-
rector and officer fiduciary duties, 87 contract failure is probable. There-
fore, according to the consensus, charter amendments sometimes should 
be subject to mandatory regulation even under a contract paradigm. 88 
85 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 
and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919, 934 (1988) [hereinafter Coffee, No Exit) ; 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1577 
(1989). 
86 Gordon, supra note 85, at 1577-84. Coffee stressed this problem of "agenda manipulation" 
over the rational apathy story. He pointed out that shareholders can easily just say no, but that 
management's ability to manipulate the agenda stilts the whole corporate contracting process. John 
C. Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1675-76 & n.234 (1989) [hereinafter Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling). 
87 See Coffee, Mandatory/ Enabling, supra note 86, at 1664-65; Melvin A . Eisenberg, The Struc-
ture of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461 , 1469-70 (1989) (close corporations); Gordon, 
supra note 85, at 1593-97. 
88 The consensus broke down over the question of the appropriate regulatory solution. Here 
strong and weak contractarians differentiated themselves. The strong contractarians, like Easter-
brook and Fischel, having acknowledged a contract failure, could not make the usual assertion that 
actors who lay out capital are intrinsically better situated to devise a maximizing term than are 
judges, legislators or bureaucrats. For a discussion of that argument, see Oliver E. Williamson, Or-
ganization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 351, 361 n.27 (1983) 
(government may be at a disadvantage with respect to recognizing organizational innovations). This 
forced them to propose procedural constraints on the amendmem process. But they stopped there. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 5, at 1444. Mandatory prohibition of 
suspect provisions, they said, should be avoided. It would choke innovation and could not be tai-
lored to particular contracting circumstances. Id. at 1445-46. See also Coffee, No Exit, supra note 
85, at '150. Easterbrook and Fischel repeat this position in the book. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 4, at 33. 
The weak contractarians advocated government intervention in the form of mandatory terms. 
Government rules can maximize, they said, where the subject matter presents informational com-
plexities and only marginally concerns the particular firm's value. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 
HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1849-50 (1989) (opting-out amendments tend to be optimal where the opting-
out concerns wealth transfers from investors to managers; expected benefits from opting-out are 
largest where the problem varies considerably over time and over cases); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, 
Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv . 1703, 1731 (1989). 
Cases where managers try to opt-out of the duty of loyalty on a broad-brush basis fit this description. 
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The appearance of this consensus against universal "opting-out" 
had paradigmatic implications. The consensus confirmed the legitimacy 
of legal intervention in corporate affairs from an economic perspective. 
In other words, corporate law and economics would go forward under 
the Williamsonian paradigm. 89 Although no one mentioned it at the 
time, this also began a process of disassociation between corporate law 
and economics and the nexus-of-contracts concept of the corporation. 
The process continues today. 
Easterbrook and Fischel joined the mandatory I enabling consensus, 
albeit with qualifications.90 Their book iterates this position.91 In taking 
this position they do not, of course, expunge contract from their theory 
of the firm. They still tell a creation story in which free contract reigns. 
But, since contract turns out to be a matter of degree, the issue goes to 
the dimensions of the zone of contract freedom provided for by a particu-
lar model. Easterbrook and Fischel's zone is rhetorically expansive, but 
more compact as a practical matter. A blank contracting slate occurs 
only in respect to recent and prospective initial public offerings. Since 
most Fortune 500 companies went public long ago, the critical questions 
respecting most corporations remain legitimate subject matter for legal 
mandates. 
(b) Takeovers reversed.-Takeovers made a contractual picture of 
the public corporation plausible in the first place. Under the managerial-
ist paradigm of the corporation, managers had unassailable and excessive 
power. As hostile tender offers proliferated, market actors broke the 
power of target managers through the simple expedient of purchasing 
shares. In effect, what was thought unassailable was assailed successfully 
through the medium of the discrete contract. As discrete contracts came 
to alter the flow of corporate power, the nexus-of-contracts corporation 
came into economic and legal theory. 92 
Furthermore, such broad-brush authorizations cannot be priced accurately, leading to unproductive 
uncertainty. Coffee, Mandatory/ Enabling, supra note 86, at 1669-70. But as to other, narrowly 
defined, more "local" matters, government should stay out. Clark, supra at 1732. 
89 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
90 This is true at least in the short run. Easterbrook and Fischel insist that in the long run 
suboptimal charter provisions will create competitive disabilities causing firms to disappear. They 
would reform the process with a procedural guaranty of approval by supermajority votes over two 
successive annual meetings. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 5, at 1442-
44. They endorse this two-meeting rule again in the book, albeit more hesitantly. EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 33. 
91 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 32-34 (the "latecomer term"). Indeed, the book 
shows that the tendency toward contract failure has intensified in the intervening years. In their 
tender offer they cite empirical evidence that shareholders often approve "contractual" provisions 
that immediately reduce the value of their stock, with the amount of the loss directly related to the 
likelihood of a takeover. Id. at 196-97. 
92 See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1520-25 (1989). 
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Fittingly, developments begun in the late 1980s in response to take-
overs are prompting the nexus-of-contracts corporation's subsequent de-
parture. Shark repellant charter amendments and poison pill plans-
"contractual" modifications that entrench management and devalue the 
shareholders' investment-retained the support of the courts even as 
they became more widespread and effective.93 In addition, state legisla-
tures came down emphatically on the side of defending managers. Their 
antitakeover statutes imposed significant costs on hostile control trans-
fers.94 Viewed cumulatively, these changes open up a rift between the 
contract paradigm's implicit normative structure, on the one hand, and 
that of actual corporate contracts and state corporate law, on the other. 
To their credit, Easterbrook and Fischel not only admit, but explore 
the negative implications of these developments for the contractual cor-
poration. They conclude that takeover law has developed in an ineffi-
cient direction. Managers exploit the collective action problem in getting 
shareholders to assent to shark repellant provisions. And, in the "last 
period," when managers defend their jobs from attack, the ordinary con-
trols of the capital and labor markets do not operate. Judicial interven-
tion becomes the only available means to the end of inefficient 
deployment of assets.95 
Furthermore, Easterbrook and Fischel abandon the "race to the 
top" story of state corporate law. This tale had it that a market for char-
ters operated among the states, with the most efficient state getting the 
most business. 96 It was first formulated to counter the assertion that the 
state corporate law system was a corrupt "race for the bottom."97 But 
the "race to the top" assertion was more than a point of critique. It 
threw the development of state corporate law into an evolutionary con-
text determined by economic competition, thereby fusing positive law 
93 The sanction by the Delaware courts of the "poison pill" as a legitimate exercise of business 
judgment, see Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), caused a shift in the 
balance of power away from hostile offerors and back to defending managers. See Charles M. 
Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54. 
94 These currently come in three models: Fair price (acquirer must offer same consideration in 
subsequent merger as in acquisition of control block), asset freeze (prohibition of business combina-
tion with acquirer for stated number of years) and control share (voting rights denied to control 
shares until disinterested shareholders vote to grant them). See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 10-
1215, l0-122l(A), 10-1222(3)(a)-(b) (1990) (control share, asset freeze, fair price); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374(e), 33-374c(b) (West 1990) (asset freeze, fair price); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 203(b)(5) (1991) (asset freeze, fair price); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 607.0901(4)(f), 607.0902(5) (West 
1990) (fair price, control share); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§§ 912(b), 912(c)(3)(A) (Consol. 1991) (as-
set freeze, fair price). 
95 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 168-70. 
96 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
97 Specifically, Delaware, acting in complete disregard of the public interest, garnered chartering 
fees by accommodating the interests of corporate managers. Cary, supra note 1. 
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and contract. Legal mandate was reinterpreted as form; the substance 
was contract. 
Today, Easterbrook and Fischel speak of the performance of state 
corporate law with less confidence. In their opinion, while survival still 
is the best measure of success, state corporate law is a process of satisfy-
ing rather than optimizing. No one, moreover, knows what the market 
wants. 98 Easterbrook and Fischel do find a contractual term to describe 
the proliferation of antitakeover statutes. In a rare resort to William-
sonian terminology, they ascribe the legislation to management "oppor-
tunism."99 But this is bravado. Their model no longer fuses state law 
together with contract so as to make economics the sole determinant of 
the law's evolution. 
C. Summary 
The nexus-of-contracts theory provided an excellent focal point for 
the Easterbrook and Fischel enterprise of ten years ago. It had shock 
value. It took the obviously mandatory and, with apparent plausibility, 
called it not merely "voluntary," but "contract." It took a situation of 
obvious contract failure and, by reference to a little financial economics, 
called it contract success. All the while it served the purpose of working 
a reversal of the academic presumption in favor of intensified regulation. 
But the picture changed around 1988. The difficult questions about the 
workability of the contractual conception became unavoidable. By 1988, 
however, Easterbrook and Fischel did not need to avoid them. The regu-
latory presumption had been reversed, and economic analysis had be-
come everyday business. The insistence on universal free contract could 
be relaxed in the interest of maintaining the plausibility of the larger en-
terprise. Meanwhile, in the takeover area, a lawmaking system once ex-
tolled as an exemplar of free contract in action acted out a nightmare 
scenario, at least from the perspective of Easterbrook and Fischel's 
model. Clearly, the original contract paradigm had outlived its 
usefulness. 
Easterbrook and Fischel have been adroitly stepping away from it 
ever since. Powerful theoretical foundations and ideological correctness 
are exciting and gratifying, but academic corporate law leans more to 
power talk than to theory talk. This power talk need not have immediate 
legal consequences in order to be plausible as talk. But the talk's plausi-
bility does require that action be at least a possible result. Since action 
occurs in the world of practice, staying plausible requires staying in close 
touch with the developments in that world and adjusting the theory ac-
cordingly. In The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Easterbrook 
98 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 218. 
99 !d. at 221-22. To their credit, they refuse to recommend federal legislation or federal preemp-
tion by virtue of the existence of the Williams Act. !d. at 222-27. 
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and Fischel make the necessary adjustments. 100 
III. GAIN SHARING AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST REGULATION 
The diminished status of the nexus-of-contracts corporation leaves 
Easterbrook and Fischel with a conventional mixed model. On the left 
hand, they work with relational contracts, omitted terms, gap filling, un-
controlled management opportunism, and necessary judicial interven-
tion. On the right hand, they rely on their creation story, stock market 
pricing of contract risk, and the presumption against regulation. The 
very structure of the mix is Williamsonian-hierarchies on the left, mar-
kets on the right. 101 The Economic Structure of Corporate Law shows us 
how Easterbrook and Fischel mediate between the two. Predictably, 
they keep double gestures to a minimum and privilege the right hand to 
the greatest possible extent. This skews their mixed model in the direc-
tion of minimal regulation. They thereby retain a distinct profile, staying 
on the market side of the mainstream even as they adhere to the consen-
sus view of the impossibility of contractual corporate governance. 
Two assertions help keep Easterbrook and Fischel's profile distinct. 
The first is that the norm of shareholder "expectations" that operates in 
corporate law should draw its content from first generation financial eco-
nomic models. The second is the presumption against regulation. Eas-
terbrook and Fischel combine the two to take a controversial position 
about legal rules that allocate shares of gain in respect of corporate con-
trol transfers, mergers, and takeovers. 
There follow some critical questions about Easterbrook and Fis-
chel's position on gain sharing and their presumption against regulation. 
A. Gain Sharing 
Easterbrook and Fischel take up judicial gain-sharing rules 102 asap-
plied or suggested for application on three fact patterns-transfers of 
controlling blocks of stock at a premium over market, investments in 
corporate opportunities by managers or majority shareholders, and cash-
out mergers. 103 They model a paradigm transaction in each category and 
100 These adjustments are made in a minimalist fashion. They stop short, for example, of ac-
knowledging that the old Berle and Means theory of separation of ownership and control has re-
turned to the fore because their market control story had failed to play out in practice. 
101 See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975). 
102 "Gain sharing" in this context concerns transactions initiated by a shareholder controlling or 
in the course of acquiring control of a corporation that, viewed substantively rather than formally 
and over the long term, yield a higher return to the controlling shareholder than to the corporation's 
other shareholders. "Gain-sharing rules" are applications of corporate fiduciary law that modify the 
formal result with the purpose of pro rata distribution of the transactional gain among the entire 
class of shareholders. 
103 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 126-44. 
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run a comparative analysis. Each transaction is value-maximizing: the 
transferee of the control block, the taker of the corporate opportunity, 
and the surviving parent in the cash-out merger each makes an invest-
ment for maximum return. 104 In each case, both the investment and the 
resulting gains are for the account of a controlling party: the selling and 
purchasing majority shareholders in the control transfer, the parent cor-
poration in the cash-out merger, and the majority shareholder or officer 
in the corporate opportunity case. Finally, in each case, the gains are not 
shared with the other equity investors in the subject corporation. 
Easterbrook and Fischel base their case against gain sharing on a 
financial economic theory of shareholder expectations. Given market 
trading, equity investors, looking ex ante, will prefer maximum aggregate 
gain. An unregulated environment assures this. At the same time, hav-
ing to forego gain in a particular case does not amount to a cognizable 
shareholder injury. Since a diversified shareholder ends up on the win-
ning side as well as the losing side in the long run, the investor prefers a 
legal rule that promotes the largest aggregate amount of investment 
gain, 105 at least so long as each transaction leaves each investor's ex ante 
holding unimpaired. 106 Sharing rules discourage gain-creating transac-
tions, thus they should be discouraged. The presumption against regula-
tion also comes to bear. Courts see only the gains, never the ex ante 
possibility of loss. They cannot recreate the risk-discounted projections 
that determine the defendant's conduct at the time it invests in the sus-
pect transaction. They therefore have no basis for allocating gains be-
tween risk-bearing and nonrisk-bearing parties. 107 
Easterbrook and Fischel extend this analysis to takeover defense fact 
patterns. They advocate a passivity norm for managers facing hostile 
offers, even though management might garner a greater share of transac-
tional gain for the target shareholders by initiating an auction. 108 They 
dislike fiduciary rules leading to auctions because, like fiduciary con-
straints of control transactions, they admit an ex post perspective that 
disrupts the economics of an earlier act of investment. 109 Once again 
they assert that rules assuring shared gain will result in lower aggregate 
104 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 112-16. 
105 !d. at 120-24. 
106 !d. at 124-25. One wonders whether a Kaldor-Hicks optimality norm could be substituted 
with the right showing. 
107 !d. at 117. 
108 This is a longstanding position. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role 
of a Target 's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Gregg A . Jarrel , Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers? 59 N .Y.U. L. 
REv. 277 (I 984). For the other side of the issue, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating 
Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. R Ev. 1028 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive . 
Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1982). 
109 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 185-90. 
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gains and injure shareholders. 110 
This line of analysis has attracted a great deal of attention. 111 The 
particulars of these debates will not be iterated here. We take up Easter-
brook and Fischel's position on gain sharing for a limited purpose. It 
gives us a look at Easterbrook and Fischel as they prescribe the root and 
branch reconstruction of an area of corporate law. This contrarian der-
egulatory position impairs their broader claim to consonance with ex-
isting law. 112 Their theory gets out of touch with the practice, and loses 
110 Jd. at 188-89. 
Ill Articles on the takeover defense problem are legion. For a sample, see those cited supra note 
108. 
Easterbrook and Fischel's position respecting sales of control, cash-out mergers, and corporate 
opportunities was set out in an early article, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate 
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705-37 (1982). The power and novelty of the article's 
challenge to fairness inquiries caused it to become very well known. Some of the responsive com-
mentary is cited infra note 112. 
112 Nor have Easterbrook and Fischel been strictly accurate in their characterization of their 
scholarly opposition. Their attack on gain-sharing rules in sale of control situations was addressed 
to a large body of commentary advocating an equal sharing rule. Andrews suggested this rule. 
William D . Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. 
L. REv. 505, 515-17 (1965). In their original commentary on this subject, Easterbrook and Fischel 
dismissed this approach as an antimanagerial proposition advocated without regard for the econom-
ics at stake. In Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 111, at 703, Easterbrook and Fischel 
describe the argument for equal sharing as follows: "[F]iduciary principles require fair conduct; 
equal treatment is fair conduct; hence, fiduciary principles require equal treatment." This is not an 
accurate characterization of the argument. 
The equal sharing proposition grew out of a positive inquiry undertaken in a cognizably con-
tractual conceptual framework, with wealth-maximization clearly stated as the ultimate objective. 
The question was whether control transactions caused injury to noncontrolling shareholder interests. 
See Andrews, supra at 516-19, 521-22; Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting 
Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 296-99 (1966). "Equal sharing" supposedly prevented 
possible injury and thus protected expectations of management responsibility. Brudney took the 
position that the sale of control at a premium should be permitted only upon a showing of informed 
consent of the other shareholders. Jd. at 297. These commentators recognized the possibility that 
the rule might in some cases inhibit control transfers motivated by the opportunity for improved 
management. Andrews, supra at 519; Brudney, supra at 297-98. Andrews thought such injury un-
likely to occur. Andrews, supra at 519. 
The discussion went on into the 1980s. Hamilton asserted that injury to noncontrolling share-
holders is a cognizable possibility, particularly with respect to small, unlisted companies. Robert W. 
Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
248, 256-59 ( 1985). Levmore, who does not advocate an equal opportunity rule, nevertheless holds 
open the shareholder injury question, stating the issue to be whether the legal system may assume 
that the new controlling party brings beneficial innovation to the firm, or whether the system should 
make specific inquiries as to the particular plans of the controlling party. Saul X. Levmore, A Pri-
mer on the Sale of Corporate Control, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1064, 1067 (1987) (reviewing DAVID C. 
BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY (1986)). 
Of course, some of the sale of control commentary did fall into the antimanagerialist mold and 
lack a basis in the economics of shareholding. Jennings's analysis, for example, makes a connection 
between control power and fiduciary responsibility and stops there. JenniJliS reasons that sales of 
control should be regulated because the control " in equity" belongs to others. Richard W. Jennings, 
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL. L. REV. I, 29-31 (1956). See also David C. Bayne, A Philoso-
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some of its coherence. 
Easterbrook and Fischel admit that the law of takeover defense does 
not conform to their model. 113 Gain sharing is what the great Delaware 
tender offer cases of the last decade are all about. 114 But Easterbrook 
and Fischel do claim that a more congenial "laissez faire" 115 regime ap-
plies to control transfers, cash-out mergers, and corporate opportunities. 
This claim does not prove out, however. It is true that the two famous 
cases that move in the direction of a sharing rule for control transfers-
Per/man v. Feldmann 116 and Jones v. HF. Ahmanson & Co. 117-sit qui-
etly by themselves in the reporters. The cases' invitations to a gain-shar-
ing constraint have not been accepted, but they seem to remain "good 
law" in their narrow spheres. As such, they still constrain the parties 
who plan these transactions. 118 As to corporate opportunities, it is not 
safe to say, as Easterbrook and Fischel do, that "a parent corporation 
may allocate a business opportunity to itself . . . even though public 
shareholders in a subsidiary believe that it is unfair." 119 On cash-out 
mergers, Easterbrook and Fischel report that under Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc. 120 the appraisal remedy, which offers no gain sharing, is exclusive 
absent a showing of fraud or misrepresentation. 121 Although this is liter-
ally correct, Easterbrook and Fischel fail to point out that the Wein-
berger fraud rule includes an "entire fairness" standard, 122 and that the 
fairness standard is read to impose procedural constraints on the cash-
phy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22, 34 (1963) (control party as strict trustee; control 
cannot be appropriated for personal benefit as it belongs to the corporation). Berle argued for the 
duty almost solely on a policy basis. Adolph A. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1212 (1958). Berle thought control transfers needed to be regulated less because there was 
something unfair about the result than because corporate control was important as an economic and 
social fact, id. at 1212, requiring standards of responsibility for its exercise. Jd. at 1224. 
113 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 209. 
114 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 
500 A.2d 1346 (DeL 1985): Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (DeL 1985). 
115 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 110. 
116 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
117 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969). 
118 For a transaction drafted to avoid possible control transfer liability, see the facts of Rabkin v. 
Philip A. Hunt Chern. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 11()()'()3 (Del. 1985). 
119 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 140 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co. , 267 
A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Myerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967)). But cf 
David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. 1968) (minority shareholder of 
subsidiary had cause of action against parent/majority holder for purloining corporate opportunity 
which rightfully belonged to subsidiary). 
Nor, so far as concerns corporate opportunities taken by officers and directors, is it all clear that 
a salary reduction follows as a give back. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 115, 141-
42. 
120 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
121 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 158-59. 
122 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983). 
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out merger's accomplishment. 123 These "fair" procedures, in turn, cre-
ate an opportunity to negotiate a share of the merger gain for the minor-
ity shareholders of the subsidiary. 124 The Weinberger court does not 
decree a "fair share" of the merger gain. But it does scrutinize merger 
procedures against the normative yardstick of the everyday arm's-length 
exchange in hopes that some part of the gain will find its way to the 
minority. 125 
The law here does not decree fair shares of transactional gain. But 
continuing concerns about gain and sharing exercise a strong influence 
on its development. The courts mediate between the positive conse-
quence of encouraging investment and the negative consequence of per-
mitting the corporate form to be used as a vehicle for the conversion of 
returns on capital invested by others. Results are mixed and context sen-
sitive. Corporate control transfers are permitted subject to an open-
ended injury rule. Corporate opportunities are treated under regular fi-
duciary rules-that is, they are prohibited subject to the possibility of a 
waiver if procedural requirements are met. The cash-out merger cases 
chart a course between permission and prohibition. They seek to im-
prove the position of minority shareholders while avoiding direct judicial 
"pie-slicing." In so doing they draw on the normative framework of con-
tract law. In contract, the parties set the consideration while the court 
monitors the relational framework in which they operate. The cash-out 
merger, like the latecomer "opting-out" situation, does not go forward in 
a viable framework for contracting. The control of the investing party 
deprives other parties of freedom of choice. Judicial scrutiny of proce-
dures results. 
Fiduciary law in the takeover area takes a similar normative per-
spective. By imagining the corporation as a contracting party selling a 
bundle of assets 126 and applying basic contract norms, one can easily de-
fend management defensive maneuvers as means to the end of a higher 
pnce. 
In sum, two series of choices determine the structure of the law in 
these situations. The first is a positive choice to model the corporation as 
an entity, followed by a choice to place the entity in the normative frame-
123 !d. at 703, 708-10. 
124 !d. at 709 n.7. The special negotiating committee is the procedural device. Whether its em-
ployment will result in a plausible reconstruction of the negotiations that precede an arm's-length 
merger is far from clear. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chern. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985). 
125 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708-15. To the extent that a problem arises because of opportunistic 
plaintiffs who wait for the risk-bearers to produce the gain and then sue, it can be dealt with by 
limiting opportunities for suit long after the fact. 
126 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard For Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
197 ( 1988). In this paper, Professor Bebchuk supports a "sole owner" standard for corporate acqui-
sitions. Under this standard, a corporation should be acquired if and only if the shareholders deem 
the offered acquisition price to be higher than the value of the corporation's assets. Accordingly, one 
subscribing to Professor Bebchuk's theory would view the corporation as selling a bundle of assets. 
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work of contract law. Easterbrook and Fischel argue for two different 
choices. Under the first, the picture of a corporate entity is dissolved, 
and a positive picture limited to market holdings is substituted. Then the 
disaggregated holdings are placed in a normative framework that is con-
tractual, but drawn from financial economics rather than contract law. 
In making these choices, Easterbrook and Fischel push their theoretical 
insistence on absolute subordination of the "corporate entity" to a place 
where neither law, nor apparently, the mainstream economics of law 127 
seems inclined to follow. 
Will this version of a rational legal regime prove out in the long 
term? The scenario seems improbable. To abandon the model of the 
contracting corporate entity is to accord absolute normative primacy to 
the market price of the stock. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that this 
should be done, even though the market price cannot be assumed to be 
efficient in a fundamental value sense. In their view, three assumptions 
are safe: first of all, prices change quickly in response to new information; 
second, price changes are unbiased in that they do not systematically 
overshoot or undershoot intrinsic value as determined over time; and 
third, the degree to which price changes reflect underlying economic re-
ality does not change substantially during short periods. 
These assumptions are not safe, however. The second and third 
have been undermined by contrarian market economists. These econo-
mists are recasting the essence of Keynes' famous "beauty contest" meta-
phor128 in a deterministic model 129 of stock market pricing. Under this 
"noise trading" approach, 130 quick price changes are not unbiased. Sup-
porting studies show that, contrary to Easterbrook and Fischel's assump-
tions, stock prices do overreact to changes in fundamentals. 131 
Moreover, investors chase trends, thereby causing aggregate shifts in de-
127 Corporate entities have a place in the Williamsonian paradigm as "governance structures." 
See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RE-
LATIONAL CONTRACTING 294-97 (1985). 
128 JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 154-
56 (1936). With his "beauty contest" metaphor, Keynes likens professional investment to newspaper 
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photo-
graphs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the 
average preferences of the competitors as a whole. Likewise, an investor is not concerned with what 
an investment is worth to the man who buys "for keeps," but rather with how the market will 
influence the investment's value. 
129 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 51-53 (1965). 
130 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. 
EcoN. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19; Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect 
Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986). Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and 
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851 (1992), provides an 
excellent discussion of this theory's bearing on legal questions. 
131 See David M. Cutler eta!., What Moves Stock Prices?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 1989, at 
4. 
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mand.132 Finally, contrary to Easterbrook and Fischel's assumptions, 
the degree to which prices reflect underlying economic reality can shift 
abruptly during short periods. The Crash of 1987 starkly demonstrated 
this. 13 3 Ex post analyses of the Crash look to illiquidity, undisclosed 
hedging strategies, and information differentials for explanations. 134 
These analyses confirm that changes in fundamental value factors were 
not the primary causes of the Dow's drop. 
It becomes increasingly less plausible to model the legal shareholder 
as the passive holder of a diversified portfolio of fifteen stocks. Given the 
assertions of the noise trading theorists, the reliance on market pricing 
implicit in this model does not impress one with its "reasonableness." 
Today's reasonable shareholder should look at market pricing as a com-
plex and volatile process that reflects fundamental value but remains sub-
ject to extraneous forces of supply and demand. This, of course, assumes 
that a unitary and simple "reasonable investor" can be modeled at all. 
Given the range of objectives among real world investors, their varying 
time horizons, the array of trading strategies they follow, and their vola-
tile sentimental dispositions, one could argue that the law should not 
make the attempt. Easterbrook and Fischel contend not only that the 
attempt should be made, but that it can succeed easily by reference to the 
efficient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model. This is a 
plausible position. But given the complex and unseWed nature of the 
economics, their "reasonable investor" should be viewed as a problem-
atic normative proposition. No empirical showing makes this model of 
the investor a matter of positive imperative. 
It should be noted that reference to noise trading theory and its real-
istic picture of the determinants of market prices does not by itself re-
solve the issue in favor of gain-sharing rules. It merely undermines some 
assumptions supporting Easterbrook and Fischel's case against them. 
Noise trading theory offers only indirect support for the conclusion that 
investors view particular investment vehicles as entities and expect pro 
rata shares of gain on invested capital. To strengthen further, if not con-
clude, the case for gain sharing, one must bring the economic rationality 
of the law to bear against Easterbrook and Fischel's deregulatory 
assertions. 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, ex post concerns respecting 
132 Shleifer & Summers, supra note 130, at 23-26. 
13 3 In early October 1987, the Dow Jones average was at the 2600 level. Then, on October 19, the 
average fell by more than 500 points on unprecedented trading volume. Before the end of the 
month, the Dow was trading at under 1800-a drop of about a third during the course of the monih. 
Unsympathetic economists took the occasion to pronounce the death of the efficient market hypothe-
sis. See Bruce I. Jacobs & Kenneth N . Levy, Th e Complexity of the Stock Market, J. PoRTFOLIO 
MGMT., Fall 1989, at 19, 22. 
134 See Michael J . Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, Portfolio Insurance and Financial Market 
Equilibrium , 62 J. Bus. 455 (1989); Gerald Gennotte & Hayne Leland, Market Liquidity, Hedging 
and Crashes, 80 AM. EcoN. REV. 999 (1990). 
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corporate allocational problems survive in the law despite the sustained 
pressure of Easterbrook and Fischel's ex ante microeconomic model. 
This treatment has an implicit economic rationality. The law, making an 
astute economic judgment, declines to attach itself to any single model of 
asset valuation. 135 It falls back on a safe assumption-that investors look 
both at market returns and at company-specific returns. The decision to 
be open-ended about valuation having been made, intervention toward 
the end of gain sharing follows from the application of basic fiduciary 
and contractual norms. Again, there is an implicit economic rationality: 
we achieve our level of wealth by integrating with one another rather 
than operating independently as autonomous, self-sufficient actors. The 
legal norms recognize the necessity of cooperation and serve as a facili-
tating mechanism. They preserve the incentive to cooperate in situations 
where private ordering inadequately protects against abuses of discretion 
by those entrusted with assets. 136 The persistence of sharing rules reflects 
a judgment that control transfers, cash-out mergers, and takeovers 
should be viewed in the context of a larger system of cooperative invest-
ment and production. 
Finally, it should be noted that the law never loses touch with polit-
ical and social concerns as it pursues the goal of economic welfare. It 
therefore holds open the possibility that an economically rational result 
might have to be qualified. In legal contexts, for example, the normative 
habit is to admit a more complex model of the person, even an actor in a 
business role, than the rational economic actor employed by Easterbrook 
and Fischel. Once the model of the person is opened up, the normative 
dynamic changes. Identity can count along with material satisfaction. A 
less precise welfare calculation based on a complex behavioral model can 
compete with a more precise calculation grounded in the economic self-
interest model. And, finally, ex post problems of unreciprocal treatment 
can compete with ex ante welfare calculations. 
B. The Presumption Against Regulation 
Easterbrook and Fischel's treatment of gain-sharing rules draws 
heavily on the presumption against regulation. The presumption's opera-
tion on judicial fiduciary rules bears scrutiny at this point. Once in-
spected, the presumption loses much of its force. 
Easterbrook and Fischel begin their analysis on safe ground. Mar-
135 In so doing it follows the economics. There is no generally accepted theory determining the 
right price for any asset. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 771-72 (1985). 
136 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 802 (1983); Earnest J. Weinrib, The 
Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. ToRONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975). See also Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of 
Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 747-48 (1978) (the 
trend in recent years has been one of ever-increasing demands for regulation in areas such as the 
behavior of corporate management in order to deter cheating and achieve fairness). 
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ket constraints operate on corporate actors, but these constraints are not 
perfect. Therefore, courts sometimes are the cheapest source of regula-
tion. However, the appropriate field of judicial intervention is narrow. It 
is limited to a small core of situations in which ex ante contracting is too 
expensive.137 
Then the presumption comes to bear and they draw a line. Fiduci-
ary constraint is cost effective only as to the basic fact patterns covered 
by the duties of loyalty and care-one shot self-dealing and hopeless in-
competence.138 In other situations: 
Costs of decision ex post will be highest precisely when it [is] also most 
difficult to contract ex ante. So when claims are made on the basis of the 
fiduciary principle--as opposed to a specific contract-<:ourts are likely to 
lack the essential tools of decision. This means that ex post settling up in 
markets has a comparative advantage over courts at enforcing the fiduciary 
principle .. .. 139 
They go on to argue that the line should be drawn with special emphasis 
in respect to control transactions. In these cases, opening the door to 
judicial intervention will lead to indeterminate and costly rules and will 
stir up litigants in pursuit of bigger shares of gain. 140 They relax the line 
only on the takeover fact pattern. There they admit that ex post market 
constraints do not operate and judges are the only recourse against man-
agerial misbehavior.141 
There are at least two problems with the line Easterbrook and Fis-
chel draw. First, it is not clear that effective ex post settling up can be 
assumed. If the complaints of today's institutional investor activists 
count as evidence, 142 ex post settling up is more an analytical construct 
than a real world phenomenon. When, given a going concern, do we 
arrive at the ex post position and extract our givebacks from ineffective 
and self-serving managers? The same information problems that make 
shareholder action ineffective ex ante would seem to recur on a continu-
ing basis, becoming a cost barrier to ex post settling up. Absent a take-
over, ex post settling up may occur in one of those infinitely long runs. 
Second, it is not clear that a material cost burden is presented by 
judicial intervention under fiduciary rules. Rules that make judicial in-
tervention possible do not make litigation inevitable in every contract 
relationship. Intervention in contract relationships under the fiduciary 
rubric occurs interstitially. In fact, a recent study indicates that large 
American corporations only rarely experience derivative actions. 143 Ju-
137 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 98-99. The result is the so-called "business j udg-
ment" rule. 
138 !d. at 99. 
139 !d. 
140 Jd. at 119. See also id. at 240 (indeterminacy). 
141 Jd. at 168-70. 
142 See supra note 14. 
143 Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J .L. EcoN. & OR-
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dicial rules have their principal effect ex ante. They channel the terms of 
future relational contracts, serving to discourage questionable behavior 
before it occurs. Indeed, rules that are not themselves optimal as con-
tract terms can cause optimal contracting by forcing actors to contract 
around them. 144 Furthermore, it is basic to corporate law that this inter-
vention only occurs where, for cost or structural reasons, corporate ac-
tors cannot effectively create their own contract terms. By hypothesis, 
then, judicial intervention works as an integral, even necessary, part of 
the evolutionary process by which actors create optimal governance 
terms. 
A volitional point about litigation costs should also be noted. Given 
expensive relationships and exhaustive lawyering, the key moment re-
specting cost occurs when the lawyer and corporate actor meet to ap-
praise the liability consequences of prospective courses of action. The 
process itself is costly, of course, and the indeterminacy of legal rules 
makes it even more costly. But, at least in the corporate area, legal pro-
fessionals bring remarkable adaptative skills to bear in keeping these 
costs under control. And, significantly, the precise amount of cost in-
curred rests in the first instance on choices the potential defendant makes 
at the planning stage. 
Today, a stronger case can be made for stepped-up fiduciary regula-
tion and against the presumption against regulation than at any time in 
the last decade. The failure of market mechanisms to control manage-
ment conduct adequately once more is widely acknowledged. 145 Curi-
ously, current discussions remain in a deregulatory mode. The 
participants look to institutional investor self-help 146 and pass over the 
prospect of less costly legal regulation. 
A decade of contractual thinking about corporate law leaves us with 
the tools to create statutes and judicial rules that regulate corporate con-
duct, while still leaving open paths for contractual innovation within par-
ticular corporations. Corporate fiduciary law has always had a tentative, 
experimental pattern of application, 147 and today it can even have a con-
ditional pattern. The enactment of corporate laws subject to "opting-
out" in particular corporations by shareholder vote is now everyday busi-
GAN1ZATION 55, 58-60, 84 (1991) (concluding that derivative actions are infrequent, and an ineffec-
tive governance tool). 
144 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
145 See the articles cited supra notes 14-17. 
146 See Black, supra note 16, at 570-91, 608 (model of shareholders' incentives to sponsor a voting 
proposal suggests that when economies of scale are strong, institutional investors have an incentive 
to take an active role in corporate management); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15 (privately 
sponsored core of independent directors to monitor management performance on behalf of 
shareholders). 
147 See William W. Bratton, Welfare, Good Will and Corporate Fiduciary Law (July, 1992) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the author). 
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ness. 148 It is the contract paradigm's contribution to the exercise of regu-
lation. Unfortunately, heretofore the device has been used to make 
management-protective innovation tolerable. It would be better used in 
the service of a more exacting legal model of management conduct. The 
regulatory improvements pursued piecemeal by today's institutional in-
vestor activists 149 also can be pursued as law reform suggestions under 
the fiduciary rubric. Liberal use of the opting-out device can minimize 
the risks concomitant with such regulatory experiments and put the bur-
den of justification on management, where the perspectives both of tradi-
tional corporate doctrine and, it seems, today's institutional activists, 
would place it. 
Easterbrook and Fischel also play at opting-in and -out, but from 
the opposite point of view. When a problem proves so complex that no 
clear cut and efficient solution presents itself, they tend to suggest that no 
positive law solution be imposed. Rather a door should be left open to 
actors in particular corporations to opt-in to their own regulations. 150 
But one can just as plausibly shift the burden, taking an opt-out rather 
than opt-in approach. This shift follows from the consensus reached in 
the mandatory/enabling discussion-that contract failure prevails in the 
governance of large American corporations. 
IV. CORPORATE LAW AS MEDIATION 
A. Corporate Politics and Corporate Entities 
Easterbrook and Fischel's economic theory reconstructs the law in 
one further respect. The primary purpose of their nexus-of-contracts 
conception of the corporation, as previously noted, 151 is to rebut the idea 
that the law meaningfully establishes producing organizations as "enti-
ties." The insight behind this assertion is that the legal corporate entity 
148 The most dramatic and widespread legislative movement toward opting-out concerns the duty 
of care. See DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991). By now at least thirty-five states have 
followed. For a list of citations, see Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to 
Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 
375, 381 n.30 (1989). 
Opting-out shows up in other venues as well. The device is widely used in state tender offer 
defense statutes, presumably as a part of a strategy to bolster the statute's constitutionality. Typi-
cally, the board gets a stated number of days after the statute's effectiveness to resolve not to be 
governed. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(2) (1991). Opt-out provisions appear in all three of 
the current models of takeover statutes. See supra note 94. 
149 These include secret ballots, independent director majorities on compensation committees, 
constraints on golden parachutes, Leslie Wayne, Seeking to Stay Out of Proxy Battles, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 1991, at D1, and limits on compensation schemes lacking ties to corporate performance. See 
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 891 (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Perform-
ance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. PoL EcoN. 225 (1990)) (low correlation between 
the compensation of managers and the economic performance of their companies). 
150 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 263 (insider trading). 
151 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
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is a reification, while transactions are events and therefore real. A defen-
sible positive theory takes account of real phenomena. · 
This is an attractive point of view. Entity theories tend to be opaque 
and can distract attention from economic matters. They also have dis-
turbing political implications. They attach larger, organic values to the 
organization, values that take precedence over individualliberty. 152 But, 
despite this inconvenience, the "organization" remains central to our ex-
perience of corporations. Corporate entities, therefore, continue to show 
up in corporate law, carrying normative content and playing apparently 
decisive roles. 153 A theoretical choice results. One can either attribute 
the entity's persistence to false consciousness and disregard it on the as-
sumption that economic rationality takes care of the problem in the long 
run, or try to explain its persistence in economically and politically ac-
ceptable terms. 
The latter choice is worth exploring, but a methodological adjust-
ment has to be made first. Economists assume that reality is comprised 
exclusively of the intentional actions of human actors. 154 This limiting 
assumption must be relaxed if we are to explain legal corporate entities. 
Reference to social theory 155 quickly assures us that this can be done 
safely. 
Contemporary social theory offers useful descriptions of corporate 
organizations which can be layered to produce a rich articulation of the 
entity concept's appearances in the law. Sometimes the "entity" shows 
up performing the functions ascribed to it in economic theory-that is, it 
works as a form that facilitates collective economic action, or as a mode 
of description for a sequence of transactions or an aggregation of capi-
tal.156 At other times, the law refers to the entity because it conceives of 
the corporation as a purposive organization, 157 and imposes a duty on 
corporate actors to respect that purpose. Thus, historically, the duty of 
loyalty is owed to the entity, not the shareholders. It is at this layer that 
the entity begins to take on normative content. 
152 These values, therefore, historically have not fared well in American legal theory. See Brat-
ton, supra note 92, at 1511-13. 
153 See infra text accompanying notes 126-27. 
154 See Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistomology of Law, 23 
LAW & Soc'y REV. 727, 730 (1989) (dismissing this methodological individualism as a "naive real-
ity assumption"). 
155 In particular, the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. See generally GUNTHER TEUBN ER, 
AUTOPOETJC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (1988). For an excellent review of 
the book, see Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoetic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. 
L. R EV. 1647 (1989). 
156 That is, the limited functions allowed the legal entity within the parameters of economic the-
ory. See supra note 83. 
157 Cf TALCOTT PARSONS, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY 16-17, 63 (1960). 
The term "organization" refers to a broad type of collectivity, an example of which is a business 
finn . The defining characteristic of the organization is the attainment of a specific goal or purpose. 
The organization is the mechanism by which that goal is implemented. 
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The legal entity must be given still more normative content if we are 
to explain its persistence in the teeth of Easterbrook and Fischel's power-
ful economic critique. At this point, reference can be made to the work 
of Professor Gunther Teubner. Teubner, drawing on the systems theory 
of Niklaus Luhmann, demonstrates that organizations are, in fact, episte-
mic subjects. He locates the "organization" not in the individuals, but in 
their communications. Through internal communications and decisions, 
he argues, organizations construct social realities of their own. They de-
velop a capacity for collective action "by communicatively constituting 
their identity" and going on to act. 158 The corporate entity takes on so-
cial reality because its collective actions are oriented around its self-de-
scription.159 As the entity takes on social reality, lawmakers respond 
protectively out of respect for the identities of the participating 
individuals. 
Teubner's theory of the firm has explanatory power. This can be 
illustrated by reference to some leading recent developments in corporate 
case and statutory law: the Rev/on 160 and Time 161 cases, antitakeover 
statutes, 162 and constituency statutes. 163 Rev/on, as is well known, im-
poses a duty to auction control of the corporation for the short-term ben-
efit of the shareholders. 164 As originally articulated, this auction duty 
attached because, on the facts of the case, "it became apparent to all that 
the break-up of the company was inevitable." 165 Under that presump-
tion, the board "no longer faced threats to corporate policy and effective-
ness."166 In other words, the board had abandoned protection of the 
existing organization and could no longer justify its actions by reference 
to the protection of the economic and social reality contained therein. 
158 Teubner, supra note 154, at 728-29. For a more extended treatment, see also Gunther 
Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and "Essence" of the Legal Person, 36 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 130, 137-38 (1988) (emphasis in original): 
The emergent quality of the "corporate actor" arises from self-description in the action system 
itself It is reflexive communication in the action system, communication on its own identity and 
its capacity for action, that constitutes the corporate actor or the collectivity as a mere semantic 
artifact, as a linguistically condensed perception of group identity. It is only to the extent that 
such a corporate actor becomes insitutionalized, L e., that organizational actors are actually 
oriented round this self-description, that the corporate actor takes on social reality. 
159 Teubner, supra note 158, at 137-38. Teubner's firm is more aptly described as a "network" 
than an "entity." He calls his approach "enterprise corporatism" and locates its rationality potential 
in terms of increased learning and higher levels of ability to communicate and process information in 
response to the two great concerns of risk and uncertainty. I owe this characterization to Joe 
McCahery. 
160 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
161 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
162 See supra note 94. 
163 See, e.g. , N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (McKinney 1991). For commentary, see David 
Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991). 
164 Rev/on, 506 A.2d at 182. 
165 Jd. 
166 Jd. 
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As a result, the shareholder maximization norm, subordinated to entity 
protection by every takeover defense case since Cheff v. Mathes, 167 finally 
came to the fore. 
Some commentators and lawyers took Rev/on to instantiate a share-
holder choice norm. Under this reading of the case, the auction duty was 
triggered by the occurrence of any control transfer. 168 From this per-
spective, Rev/on brought the framework of economic agency theory to 
the law of takeover defense. But, as Time later showed, nothing could 
have been further from the case. The auction duty is triggered by aban-
donment of the "entity" and the values associated with it. Furthermore, 
protection of these values also helps explain the rapid proliferation of 
antitakeover and constituency statutes. 
Admitting the entity into the discussion of takeover defense effec-
tively admits distributive politics into the description of corporate law. 
Easterbrook and Fischel's economic theory, in contrast, draws a hard 
line against distributive concerns. They do not, however, take the posi-
tion that such politics do not or should not proceed. They simply remit 
the process to a venue outside of corporate law. They note, fairly 
enough, that an economic theory should work singularly toward welfare 
maximization, leaving distribution to a subsequent analytically separate 
process. 169 But this normative clarity sometimes comes at the cost of 
inadequate description. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel account 
for state antitakeover statutes in terms of "opportunistic behavior by cor-
porate managers." 170 This is a "stab-in-the-back" account that recog-
nizes only the contractual, dark side of a complex politics. Antitakeover 
legislation did not sweep the country solely because an organized mana-
gerial pressure group exploited the cupidity of corrupt politicians. Man-
agement certainly promoted the legislation out of self-interest. But the 
legislation they promoted was politically expedient because it instanti-
ated values of consequence and accorded with a plausible maximization 
story. The combination of factors caused it to became ubiquitous. If the 
legislation ought to be repealed, then surely the most effective political 
strategy confronts the values that legitimized the legislation in the first 
place. The issue thus joined is one of mixed politics and economics: 
whether the economic benefits of repeal outweigh the perceived costs of 
disrupting existing corporate institutions. Unless the politics are admit-
ted, legal theory is disabled from addressing the issue. 
Readmitting politics and "entities" into corporate legal theory im-
plies no normative commitment to the primacy of management auton-
omy. Nor does it necessarily serve as a conceptual entering wedge for 
167 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964 ). 
168 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier K.raakman, What Triggers Rev/on?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. 
R EV. 37 (1990). 
169 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 37-38. 
170 /d. at 221-22. 
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the justification of an industrial policy or some other corporatist pro-
gram. 171 The immediate purpose would be the same as that of The Eco-
nomic Structure of Corporate Law, which is to explain a present legal 
system. The difference would lie in the description's normative implica-
tions. Under the economic paradigm, corporate law does one thing-it 
serves as an instrument for the achievement of maximum wealth. With a 
thicker description, this functionalist constraint relaxes, while normative 
instability and conflict come in to the picture. One is invited to conceive 
of the law as a mediative agency as well as a welfare-enhancing one. 
B. The Mediative Structure of Corporate Law 
Legal theorists and legal decisionmakers deal with the same corpo-
rations, but they approach them differently. The theorists aspire to pro-
vide objective answers to all questions. Their theories tend to pose clear-
cut, determinant choices among alternatives. Legal decisionmakers 
share the theorists' aspirations. But, in the world of cases and legal prac-
tice, the subject matter of legal debates never seems to be determined 
once and for all by reference to an objective theory or a metaethical 
scheme. Though legal decisionmakers aspire to theoretical certitude and 
consistency, in the end they tend to mediate between the alternatives. 
Accurate descriptions of legal doctrine take cognizance of its mediative 
aspect. 
In practice, corporations are complexes of diverse elements that re-
sist reduction into the neat rationalized blueprints of legal and economic 
theory. They have a complex of foundations. They are welfarist instru-
ments. They also are nexuses of interpersonal relationships with ethical 
implications. They advance each participant's self-interest. But they 
also demand individual sacrifices to collective goals. They are nexuses of 
contract relationships. At the same time they are self-referential sys-
tems-separate entities with identifiable, albeit reified, contents. They in-
clude relational contracts and discrete contracts. They result from free 
contract and yet entail empowerment and dependence. They amount to 
hierarchical power structures in some respects, and artifacts of arm's-
length contracting in others. 
Corporate law's mediative aspect follows from sensitivity to this 
practice. The doctrine draws on all of the foregoing conceptual bases. In 
so doing, 172 it avoids the foundationalist error of excluding one basis as a 
function of respecting another. Instead, it mediates between the various 
components and norms in the complex, toward the end of mediating be-
tween and among the people involved with corporations. 
171 Teubner, for example, would advocate an industrial policy. See Teubner, supra note 158, at 
131. 
172 It does not lapse into relativism in so doing because it accords each basis recognition as an 
objective force. 
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Corporate law thus stems in part from the actions and values of the 
actors involved and, in part, from the state. It is partly mandatory and 
partly enabling. To structure corporations, it draws on both the model of 
trust and the model of agency. It also draws freely on both contract and 
fiduciary principles. It does not adhere to any single positive theory of 
the firm. It leaves even definitional matters unsettled and subject to me-
diation.173 Different conceptions of the firm, instead of being synthesized 
in law, are synchronized in time and circumstance.174 An accurate de-
scription of corporate law must account for this mediative aspect. 
A mediative approach provides a basis for a satisfying theory only if 
one reduces his or her expectations about what theory can achieve. To 
many, good legal theories consistently apply a single or limited founda-
tion. Easterbrook, Fischel, and other contractarians, for example, evalu-
ate explanations of law in terms of instrumental rationality based on the 
economic welfare goal. To an observer steeped in a methodology of this 
sort, a mediative description of law at best amounts to a iheoretical 
failure. 
Against this reproach can be ranged several advantages. First of all, 
a mediative approach provides access to a more sensible legal description 
of the corporation. Methodological correctness does not necessarily en-
hance a theory's descriptive accuracy. Legal practices, viewed as a 
whole, are unlikely rationally and consistently to manifest one or another 
limited conceptual basis. Corporate law certainly has resisted reduction 
to neat articulations from narrow foundations. Its many apparent incon-
sistencies persist with undiminished strength despite many attempts to 
eliminate them through theory. 
Oddly, a mediative approach also opens access to corporate legal 
theory. It allows one to draw on the strengths of different theories even 
as they compete. Corporate law legitimately may be conceived of as a 
positive law template for corporate organization with an accompanying 
rule book. It also may be conceptualized in terms of market contracts, as 
Easterbrook and Fischel demonstrate. Given a mediative approach, 
173 The definitional question whether corporations should be conceived of and treated as entities 
that transcend the presence of individuals who participate in them receives different answers in dif-
ferent legal contexts. In some contexts, entity treatment makes normative and practical sense. In 
other contexts, firms seem better conceived of as aggregates of relationships between participating 
actors. Here, once again, positive choices have a normative aspect. Entity treatment may "make 
sense" in a given situation because of a decision that duties to the group "ought" to obtain. Even the 
legal definition of the corporation, then, remains a matter of ongoing normative discussion that rests 
on ethical presuppositions. For detailed discussion of the contingent nature of our positive concep-
tions of firms, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts " Corporation: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989). 
174 Corporate Jaw also mediates between corporate organizations and the outside world. Here it 
tends to balance the corporate actors' contract freedom against outside interests. It affords corporate 
actors great discretion to do business as they see fit, but secures them no right of contract freedom. 
To the contrary, it imposes a juridical base of limited, conditional contract freedom. See Bratton, 
supra note 173, at 436-46. 
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neither conception is accorded foundational status, yet neither is disre-
garded. The insights of both can be considered. 
Second, a mediative approach is normatively responsive. Legal me-
diation uses practical reason to synchronize the competing demands and 
values of actors through the appeal to legal principle. 175 Legal princi-
ples, while they do not provide a track to a single right answer, do offer 
guidance. They isolate wrong answers 176 and offer information regarding 
the values at stake in the decision between competing solutions. 177 
A mediative conception of the law thus can be useful, despite mod-
est theoretical aspirations. It encourages better understanding of the 
"tough questions." Where two valid but inconsistent normative direc-
tives come to bear on a problem, mediation is required. The choice be-
tween the two is a matter of judgment. By articulating the reasons 
behind a doctrinal inconsistency rather than ignoring or suppressing 
them, one learns something about the properties of these legal judgments. 
The great normative decisions in corporate law occur at these medi-
ative junctures. These are points at which decisionmakers breach endur-
ing conflicts for situational resolution. Closed and consistent legal 
theories are ill-suited to identify and explain them. And if deep and hid-
den rationalities inform the law, they do so at these points. 
Thus, the assertion is that an inspection of corporate law reveals 
legitimate, ongoing normative conflicts. Given a legitimate conflict, one 
can only try to mediate, for theories alone cannot offer directive signals 
with surety. But identifying the conflict's sources and parameters, in-
cluding its economics and the other values at stake in their resolution, 
improves this difficult situation. A legal decisionmaker, thus briefed, 
renders a judgment of high quality. 
Third, a mediative approach keeps legal theory attuned to develop-
ments in business practice. Corporate doctrine is mediative in part be-
cause decisionmakers take a relational role. They strive to employ norms 
consonant with those woven into the fabric of the relationships corporate 
actors bring to them. These norms change over time. 
The relational constraint bears importantly on the future of the cor-
porate law. Rules articulated in the past remain appropriate only to the 
extent that future corporate practices repeat past patterns. Assume, for 
example, that a particular corporate participation evolved from a basis of 
relational contract to a basis of discrete contract. Assume also that 
norms of individual autonomy customarily apply to the new, discrete ba-
sis. In this scenario, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law would be 
an appropriate reference for the lawmaker. Reconsideration of any in-
175 Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: Th e Promise of R edemption and the Possibility of 
Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1687, 1705 (1990). 
176 !d. at 1704. 
177 The proposition in the text is the operative assumption of the traditional law teacher who 
seeks to teach students to be "comfortable with ambiguity." 
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herited fiduciary norms with a view to abandonment would seem to be 
indicated. The change in relational pattern causes the continued applica-
tion of fiduciary constraints to violate the presupposition of respect for 
the expectations of corporate actors that shaped them in the first place. 
Arguably, something akin to this relational-to-discrete transforma-
tion has occurred during the 1980s in respect of corporate security hold-
ing. The shortening of time horizons, the proliferation of sophisticated 
holding strategies, the expansion of classes of traded securities, and the 
corporate restructuring movement together moved relationships to a 
more arm's-length basis. 
Against this dynamic background, Easterbrook and Fischel 
prompted a reordering of academic corporate law's normative presump-
tions by bringing to bear ideas that would have been dismissed as absurd 
two decades earlier. It remains to be seen how much normative force 
these ideas will carry in the future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At least in the context of corporate law, economic analysis has a 
way of relegitimizing present institutions even as it changes our ways of 
thinking about them. It is not surprising that The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law is at its most powerful with its cumulative showing of 
corporate doctrine's implicit economic rationality. At the same time, the 
book is least persuasive when it takes reconstructive positions. 
The book's-and its methodology's-tendency to confirm the legiti-
macy of extant legal institutions can mean one of two things. Either the 
economists' positive assertion is correct and we should expect our ex-
isting institutions to be artifacts of narrowly rational self-seeking con-
duct, or the rationality that informs the calculative exercises of law and 
economics is based on assumptions shaped by values drawn from an in-
herited social and political context. One hopes that the next generation 
of corporate legal theory holds open a place for both possibilities. 
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